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IS 'j'Jl £ W8S'r HE:SPONSlBtB FOR LENIN ' S RISE '1'0

PO'v'it·~it:

S'l'EPi! i::~ ! D. J?ANSl!:Y
EUiWl' EAN SlJ•llNA!-?

DR . VII LLIJ\N 'rHORI-i
1\J:RIL 22 , 1981

The year 1917 is probably the most significant year in
modern Russian history .
of the Bolsheviks .

Many people view this as the year

Indeed , Lenin and his cohorts seized the

r eigns of government i n November (all dates will be given in
New Style) of that year and pr opelled Russia down an untrodden
path of history .
globe .

The effects of this

r evo l utio~

now

perme~te

the

Some view that fateful day as the begihning of man ' s

salvation from the exploitation of capitalism .

Others view

it as the birth of a pernicious disease which must be eliminated
in a final apoca l ypt i c battle to save mankind .
few people study the actual events of 1917 .

However , far too

Wh i le scholarly

work on the per iod is voluminous , many of the wo r ks are skewed
by the ideological perspective of the authors .

Few people , .

aside from historians , are cognizant of the historical actions
which finally resu l ted in the triumph of Bolshvism .
This paper wiil discuss the events leading to No vember 7,
1917.

Howe ver , I will not focus on th e activities of the

Bolsheviks during the eight months leading to the November
revo l ution .

There arc many accounts detailing this amazi ng

ri se to power .

I will , instead , focus on a somewhat neglected

facet of the Bolshevik revolution :
the Provisi onal

Gove rn~ e nt

Alexander Ke r ensky .

that is the policies of

and specifically the policieo of

While much scholarship has been done on

this period , I wi s h to concentrate on the Provisional Go vernment's decision to r ernaln committed to the Allied cause in
YJorld War I .

I part i cu larly wish to demonstrat e that the

l

2

Alli ~s

wer e r esPonsible . at l east in Da~t . for: Ker enskv ' s

decision to

r ~ma in

in tte Wa r and ' that. t~is fn

pitated t he Bolshevik Revolution in November.
this I will implicate· the. Alli es ·as partially
the Eolsh evik ascension
~a i sed

to · . oower ~ ,_. · . This

turn . nreci~

In d emonstratinR
· r esponsibl~ . for

implication has ·been .·

1;;.· few schofars ; Tmos.trhatre<·been~ · insteac:i . •!:.fnte'l7est~d

in 1. ·demoristratin'g •1tl1e·~·perni~i:ous ::n·a:t.ur.e :.·o·r

r-Bo];sh'~v{sm;:.] :: v) ~ v i~=-: ,

the · ind ecisive· ·nature' of· Ker·ensky/:or:· the · his:torical n eces - · · ·
sity ,6f

Bolshevism ~

This
Kerensky

~aper·

will chronologically

and . th ~

~ e ta il

th e ac tions 'of

Provisiorial : Governcient from its inception in .

March unt!l its d em is e . in No:vember . .: The f.ocus , as stated·:
ea~lier,

the

will

Allies ~

be . on~he .. decision

to :r emain in the _war

eff eqt in d_et~rm inine th.a 't- decision.

will not be given to the mo_:tives _of .Allied

~nd .

Discussion

poi icy~'' although

it_

is obvious . that ·.th e All:ies were involved ' in· a :·war ,and · were
naturally d evoting .their energi ei ' to
tion of that war .

However ; .more presci ent

t~ e Bols~evik

have prevented

the . sucrie~sfu l . pros~bu
diplom~cy . m<iY:

rise .to':: power. . George J:<ennan ,

an eminent Sovi et special'ist ,, -concludes : that 'The .~ ·Russian ~,'Revo
lution and the alienation . of the .Russian pEopl e from the ·
Western · community for decad~s to come w e~e only a par~ bf
th e staggerinG price paid by .the West <: rr. people for . their
insist enc e on

com~le ting

1917 and 1918 . "

1

Ir. Pa r l y 1917 , the
the

s u ff ~ rin g

a military victory eve r Ger ma ny in

Russia~

people

we r ~

tir ed of war ,

CRused by the war and t he fOVe rnm ent ' s bungling

war policies.· As esrly as Sul.y, 1915 the Minist~r ofWar,
General Polivanov,

;i.s~·quoted aq sayi~g

victory and in their leaders has

that:_- HFa.it.h7in.,\iltimate

been,unP,ermineP,.H~

A western scholar writing in early 1922 commented that:
"Not only the army; but the rear guard of every arrtiy, the.
tiVil,population,· was. sick untp death·and weary of suffering."3
A Dutch diplomat dispatched to Russia in early/1917 perhaps

summarized the ·stmosphere best:

"The War had not gone well

for Russia: an atmosphere of depres~ion ·hung over.the country."/.;.
An American journalist residin·g in Petrograd · <l'ev:eal'~Ld.n:..:his diary
'that he--concJ.uded- ori

J'anuary :31, 1:91'7 ·t'ha:t ;nthere. i"s no .tloubt .

cth.it •:a· revolution :Es co1ning;'g~~- John ·Gaddfs,
~inatf'c

'hist·orfan,
rema'rks in
· ..

·ret:rosp~e~o:-tt

a:n

-:Arn'e-rican. diplo-

that <!'three.:·:tyears.:d

!o'f bl'dody ~·and• mismanage{d cotrfl:L:C:.t had so cdemorali:z'ed·_';CRu~ssia)
;as ·to':'r.erid'~~ (it1S' n~w goVe~~~nt~'·?apa~l'~;_c.o::t>:re·maig·ingtrin ~au.t.hoi·i ty
only by end~ng act~ ve part~cJ.patJ.on J.n ·the·. war."
Yet, Kerensky and the members of the Provisional Government did not reol:ize tho depth of anti-war sentiment among
the people.

This rising tide of anti-war sentiment finally

rose and swept Kerensky out of power and replaced him with
the only leader who promised·pcace~ Lenin.
Bsks the reader to note

11

Again, Kennan

how intimiately the causes of

Kerensky's failure were connected with his effort to continue
Russia I s participation in WVII. u7

He concludes that:

11

In

every respect Kerensky's political position would have been
eased, ond his prospects for resistance to Bolshevik pressure
would have been improved, had he been able to take the country

cf

::~ut

\V~~r'

{., j_,. J
\·;~p

P,

;:jt

0:-lC(:."

Lc-nnc.\:'l odm.i t::.; that "I <J:n not sure

!1 cl . . ~;s si.1Jd~,· of the political environment of
AlJ.i~s

the period and the actions of the
8~swer

to this vexipg

to 8bso1utism ..

illu~lnatc

will

the

q~estion.

Thc:ee arc m<my

intcrprctatic:r:~:

may

It·

of the rcascn::.;

b·et cbnc1uded; that·~'· ~c

'

i~

~

h~v~

corepletp

b~sn

thr

dPC8Y

of thn

source of power.

c0ntraliz~d

mi~int~rpretuti~n by l.er~nsky

both

8

•

and others

+

1.

SC;Cl<L.t.lS~

'

,~/.

1

and

<J

~ithin

nationali::;t.

"; -~-. c ':::

arn qul t::_: c ~nv inc cd

that but for the War the Revolution would have come not later
than the spring of .1915, perhaps even at the end of 19111-." 1°
In other words, to Kerensky the socialist dial(ctic would
come to a stop while all Russians defended the Motherland.
His nationalism skewed his vision and prevented him from
seeing that the War was augmenting, not weakening, this
movement towards revolution.
Kerensky, instead, blamed this growing ievolutionist
sentiment on dissatisfaction with the

inefficienci~s

of the

Tsar's government in pursuing the war, not in the Tsar's basic
decision to pursue the war.

In explaining the causes of the

if!arch Revolution he states:

"The preservation of. absolutism

and the cause of successful resistance to the enemy stood in
tragic contradiction to one anothc~.··11

Yet Kerensky's skewed

vision of the reasons for the revolution

c~mpelled

eliminate absolutism and to try to
war instead.

him

pur-sue:~suc.ces$~fu"1U.y

t~attempt

-the

The result was a complete dissipation of all

power, allowing extremists complete freedom
to multiply their

ran}~s.

io

agitate arid

A more realistic premise concerning

the causes of the March Revolution may have given Kerensky
.....

(}:

reson to. end Russia Is participation in the \'/ar and to eliminatc absolutism without inviting

anarch~.

Kerensky was not alone in his interpretation of the
revolution.
''s€hbia~~bflthe~pe~iod1 6o~cffiudestthat
Gov~rnmentl tried

the entitetnBnovisional

tol:tr.eat!:J the revolution_: as'l~ Palace i':-.r~

crevolution and ri.btlas& a •social! tUprd:.si:i:l.g<, demanding:;e; ;:iC ~
change. 11 12 One diplomat did conclude that those who ac-

to

J.l'

cepted the theory that the revolution was merely a:move to.
ensure a better, more organized fighting force_were "a lot of
simpletons and are letting themselves .in for a bitter.disappointment."13 ·A newspapei reporter, _Arno·Posch-Fleurot,
writing in Fetrograd at the

tim~

had possibly the most

inrisive analysis of the situation.
national revolution against autocracy wa:·s
being turned into a factional revolution .
.agai!}St< :thee~ existent· ard er~·Of SOCiety~ \"and
the success of the factional revolution was
assUred by. the:ihsittende=offth~that~Qnallyminded. rvrolutionists to go' on ofighting
.
the war,_:.·.
A

Gover,nmt;nt- to:' ~emain -:incthe""! War .r: :.~~This:. U[lprec ed ent ed .war
must be carried through:: to final victory.

He who thinks of :
peace at the pr~sent moment is a traitor to Russia." 15

It is natural for people to associate leaders with the
policies they advocate.
a certain policy.

Here a discredited leader advocates

It would seem logical that the new

leade~

would try to divorce himself from the fallen leader and his
discredited policies.

However, Kerensky tried to draw the.

distinction between the Tsar and his policies.
admitt~d

that

~many

He later

Duma deputies did not realize how deep

were the wrath and indignations of the masses in

l~etrograd

·

against the chiefs and representatives of the old regime."16
What Kerensky failed to grasp was that these fallen leaders
had also tainted the policies they had implemented.

The

people were demanding change and Kerensky only offered them
more of the same on the war issue.

..,
I

.As the Tsar fell from power, two centers of power emerged.
The former Duma, which had been dissolved by the Tsar, .now met
as a Committee of the Whole in the same building where they
formerly, met as official Duma m~mbe~s.

Also .emerging

was a Soviet of .Workingmen',, and Sold i.er~ Deputies.
~

',

This soviet

'

had first emerged at the instigation, of Trotsky during the
1905 Revolution. · r:erensky was the· only person.(t~ serve in
'

'

both the Provisional G6vernment and the .Soviei.
.·
' /

'

~

He was soon

appointed Minister of Justice in the inchoate frovisional
"

Government and also served as Vice-Chairman of the Eocecutive
Committee of the Petrograd Soviet.

A great debate ensued:

among the socialist concerning Kerensky's role in the Frovisional Government.

Kerensky decided he would

se~ve

in

both organizations and did so over many objections among the
members of the Soviet.

Kerensky later admitted that. "from.·

the first days of the Revolution my r.elations with the Sov.iet
leaders were strained."l?
Mass chaos pervaded· tfie.·atmosphere as no.·.one·.lsource of
power could demonstrate any legitimacy_to rule.
not

experience~.

Russia had

such a void of leadership since the infamous

Time of Troubles at the·beginning of the 17th century.
need only read Richard

~Pipe

Cne

•'s; book Russia Lnd er the Cld
'

Regime to understand the affects a dissolution of the. monarchy
would have on

~fhf~

patrimonial state.

The

~rovisional

Government desperately needed some source of recognition to
demonstrate their legitimacy. t·.J

·:;J_,,.

The Provisional Government sought their source of legitimacy fro;-:1 tr.e Allies.

The Allies were glad to give this :.-::.·..yc

~rovisiorial

legitimacy, provided that the

Government would

take a strong stand in fav6r of a continued war effort.
According to Kerensky the Provisional Government

initial~

ly had no official opinion on the war and its aims. · "Cn
the-~rovisional

this·question of the War and its aims

Govein-

ment was left absolutely freE, taking upon itself no formal

.,

.

obligations, being at liberty to act as it wisi{E{d
and pro,.

~ecessary." 18

claim whatever war aims it deemed proper and

The Allied ambassadors, however, im~ediateiy began to. pressure the Provisional Government.

I\iauric e Pabologue, ·.the

French ambassador; played a key role in pressuring the Government to pursue the war.

Paleologue saw

~aul ~iliukov,

Minister of Fo.reign l1ffairs, immediately after the abdication
of the Tsar.

He urged "very strongly that.the Provisional

Government should delay no longer in solemnly proclaiming its
loyalty to the alliance and its deterrnine:.tion tG continue.
tt19'
the war at anv cost.

The supercilious ambassador re-

turned on March 18 to see r.liliukov.

"Whatever reasons you

may have for going slowly with the hotheads of the Soviet,
you must realize that I cannot tolerate any doubt about your
determination to continue the alliance and carry on the war.•• 20
Miliukov published a statement of
position on r.:arch 20 which ... :~lie~_;·_
the demanding ambassador.
would~

.t'u:J_.fill

Government's ·

thought vwuld satisfy

He statE-::d tthattthe"first:.taskJ

be. i"to :carr.y..-: th~. waxt .1t.o..~.a.

prgntr:s~d: r 11 to

Y

the~

vd:c_td~ious. :conc_1usion" ~and

r·lm~li~C.hi·!lgly -~if:he <~g~eem_e.nts 1~0!1C:l.uded
·... ,:
C :.:~·l~·.~··.::.,,,
J~._,J

r.~
i-~·,· .
.... ~J."'

\·';"'
,

__

;

-1·,,
........

'1
I"

v'·"'{.~--~·i.,,;":
.•
..• \ ...... _ •..~.l........ ~

(~' r,c}

•

. 'I

\,However,"

the1TFrench··~.a.moassad6r ~:wa:s

Chat: fsat·:fsfied;

In.rttiliukov's words he "carne running to me and pounced on
me with indignation and bitter reproaches."
Paleologue:

He quotes

"Germany is n6t mentioned at all:

Not the
slightest reference to our aims in the war: ..... 22 · Miliukov

tried to placate the ambassador by promising future confirmations of the Russian. will to fight.
The French ambassador was not alone in
young Government.

After taiking

to~~iliukov

the

~ressuring

the.American .

ambassador, David Francis, assured his government that ''the
administration of the new Government was right-thinking,
sincere, and.would prosecute the war

fearl~ssly,

regardless

of its cost iri blood and treasure."

Rodzianko (former

Chairman of the Duma) and Miliukov both assure me that the

.
Provisional Government will vigorously prosecute
the
The English Ambassador, Sir George Buchanan,

"3

war.~~

r~ceived

follow.ing message soon after the March Revolution:

the

"J, 11

your influence should be thrown into the scale against any
Administration which is not resolved to fight to a finish." 24
Paleologue, again, symbolized the Allied position in 1917.
When he was approached by an itinerant band of students·
celebrating the Revolution he responded to their inquiries
by saying "I cCJ.n render no better homage to Russian liberty
t~an by asking you to join me in shouting 'Vive la Guerre.'"25

The ambassador was obviously wrong.

The demands of the

political situation in Russia were in conflict with the
demands of the Allied War effort.

George Kennan refers to

10

the Allied policy of only pursuing the war as "myopic" and
further states that the American policy was based on "ignorance."26

He illustrates this conclusion by pointing to

the Allied Diplomatic conference held in Petrogratd,:i. ~efo;r_-~ythe
Marc·h~Jl!'.:evolut"ib'n.

The purposes .\Of this- conference were to

stimulate the Russians td new war efforts and to'plan for a
spring effensive.

Kennan feels that the Allies'" missed a

grand opportunity to witness first-hand the internal chaos
that had made Russia's continued

effort impossible.

wa~

points to the post-conference statements of
French Minister of Colonies,

~s

Dourmorg~e,

He·
the

evidence that the opportunity

had been missed: ·"It is clear from all the conversations I
had and all that I saw that Russia is filled with a unanimous
will to pursue the war to a complete victory." 2 7 Cbviously
he had been deceived by 6thers or by his own self-fulfilling
wishes.

Kennan criticizes this "myopia" and concludes that

"to try to drive them to it G.tlie' war];"was :.tox::p.I)QV.i..d~yg.r,i~st
.

')~

to the mill of the agitator and the fanatic.".::"'
Y.erensky bec·ame (;by_ ;mid-snmm~r.

th;E! W.moqt ~,±_nf:J__U\=l.nt:)..al:'~-II!~!J. r~n

A western journalist wrote on !';larch 20 that "Kerensky is the

idol of the people and everything he does makes him more
popular. n29

ra leolocue

also recognized :r:e~r·cnsky influence:

"Kerensky is a man we must try to win over to our cause.
He alone .is capable of making the Soviet realize the necessity
of continuing the wa.r."3°
Kerensky of the

Paleologue did indeed convince

benefic~nce

of the Allied policy and Keren-

skv succeeded in convincing the Soviet that the war should be
"

Russia.

continued until a general . peace could be found.

·In doine so,

however, Kerensky extinguished debate on the crucial question
of the masses.

Without a party in power which represented

their basic longing for peace, the masses turned to the only
party that promised immediate peace, the Bolsheviks.
A western expert writing in
.

.

1926 expressed the opinion
.

'

that the "bourgeoisie had been completely deceived and had
wildly over-estimated the enthusiasm of .the working class
for the war."3 1

Another expert con~ludes that "out of touch

with the real mood of the country, the liberal. leaders had
assumed a patriotic devotion where none existed."3 2

This

expert cites Ckhrana reports from as early as 1916 which
concluded that many amo!'lg the masses believed that "the war
cannotbe concluded successfully, and ought to be ended now."3)
apparatu~

While Kerensky tried to restore the administrative

of the state and fix the foundation of a new state and s6cial
order; he also proclaimed that "one of the main duties was
?,I•

to carry on the war.""'"'

~nder

these circumstances, with

little support for the war among the lower classes,

~~erensky

was pursui'ng:.! .. a policy doomed to fail.
A western observer concluded at the time that "there

is no question that in the first days of the Revolution the
only cry that went up from Russia was a cry for peace.
passionate desire for peac(; was univc:rsa.l.";5

A

Yet this

desire was not reflected in the Provisional Government.

The

Fetrograd Soviet even passed a resolution on April 13 favorina a successful prosecution of the war.
D

~erhaps

the efforts

of the Allies were affecting the policies of the

~rovisional

Government which was still searching foi its legitimacy.to
rul• .
b~en

Ambassador Franc is .-ca:lil-ed Vinshington that:

"It has

my effort ... to impress upon all the importance of-a

vigorous prosecution of the war and: to subordinate ~h_er_et!o_,
allquestions as to the rights of races or the recognition of·
classes."J6

However, soon the beleaguered Sovi~.f would begin

to hear the cries for peace and thus
crisis of the Provisional

the first

precipit~te

Government~

'

To many the notion of a separate peace was considered
shameful and ·incompatible with the honor and dignity of
Russia~·

This precipitated among some socialistE,theclu01ng
i'""l
_,_ ...

the slogan "war or revolution,"

This policy was based onthe

premise that either the rEvolution will kill the. war or the
war will kill the revolution." 37

This lltlieoryt:: resulted in ·

a cry for a general peace based on the moral repudiation of
the imperialist designs :of all governments through
intern2tion2l proletariat:

This

Cth~o~yc

2

united

spurred efforts by

some Russians to organize an international peace conference
at Stockholm.

These efforts will be discuqscd later; the
'

immediate effect was intense pressure from the Soviet exerted
on the frovisional Government to lead the way in announcing
a policy of "peace without annexations or indemnities."

A serious crisis developed as Kerensky and

~iliukov

argued over the publication of Russia's war aims.

~iliukov

published a statement of war

~ims

consistent with the slogan

"no idemnities, no annexations" 'on March 28.

However, this

statement was made only for domestic consumption.
stimulate some dissent·among the

membe~of ~he

It did

Soviet be-

cause of references to Russia's "observance fully (of) the
obligations which have bee~: adopted with pespect ·to our ~llies

>38

This was a reference to the now famous "secret :)treaties"
which Russia had signed ~a~lier giving her control of the
Dardflnelles and Constantinople . after
a successful completion
.
~

of the war.

This opposition'smoldered for some time and was

then revised by Kerensky in April.
only he among the

me~bers

of

th~

He began proclai~ing that

Provisional Government

supported fully the slogan "no ·ind ernni ties, no annexations." 39
'

The Soviet soon began to demand that Miliukov send an address
to the Allies proposing that· they renounce ~ali :·:u:a:imexati·ons.·S.nd
indemnities."
Miliukov finally agreed to send the Allies a note
merely informing them of Russia's war aims.

Miliukov, how-

ever, inserted a statement which read:
Certain of the victorious conclusion of the
war, united to our Allies, it is equally
sure that the issue raised by this war will
be settled in the sense of the realization
of a secure and lasting peace, and that
the advanced democracies inspired by the
same desires, will find means to obtain the
sanctions and guarantees necessary to
avoid fHEther sanguinary conflicts in the
future. }
This statement obviously tried to obviate the purpose of
the note:

to renounce Russia's imperialistic treaties.

A great debate ensued between Kerensky and Miliukov.

The

.lh'

Allies played a key role in this debate.

Faleologue firm~

ly supported Miliukov bu·t Buchanan sided with Kerensky.
Also, the socialist delegation from France, headed by Albert
Thomas, who would soon replace Paleologue, sided with Kerensky.
Officially, Miliukov was supported:

He proclaimed to Thomas:
.,

"I was too victorious."4l

Actually, however, the riftthad·
.

'

,

'

"Jt'

emboldened those who wished to form a· c oali tioq:l' government.
This resulted in more socialists coming into the Government,
~nd

Kerensky's rise to Minister of Kar,
tio~

Miliukov's resigna-

the day before ~aleologue left for his returo to France.

~iliukov

had tried to

w~lk

a tight-rope between offending the

Allies and offending the Soviet.

He had failed.

A new phase'

of the revolution had begun but' still Russia had not extracted
itself from that dreadful war.
Before

iPaleo~ogU:e.tcs:

Tim~

dep·ar:ture

was growing short.

~on'e

,bf: .:hi;s. :Hprimera:nd of

jti'diCiious'' csources ,cdrtfe':ssed that:
H6wever painful such ari admission must be to
me, I feel I'm only doing my.duty in coming to
tell you that the war cannot go on. ?eace
must be made at the earliest possible moment ... Necessity is the law of ,history. ,
No one is c::J~.~~;clled to do the impossible. 4 2
Paleologue responded:
You mny be quite sure that ·the moment au~sia
betrays her Allies, they will repudiate
her ... Your Allies· also have the power of
the purse which is 8bout to be doubled if
not ~ripled by the help of the United States.
We shall thus be in a position to continue
the war for as long as is necessary. I
must admit, howtver, that I have Eet %he
same pessimism on all sidE:s during the
last few d8ys. 4'3
Yet the tllies continued to push the Russians to fight.
Pmerica appropriated $100 million in cfedits and

~15

million

15
in cash to entice Russia to stay in the War.

Francis still

felt that the world situation. "demanded activities on my
past to assist the Russian Government to keep the Russian
armies fighting.
y,r
'r'#

8

r .•

,,,.
. · .. '-r'+

• •

'

My constant effort is to keep

No doubt such a policy

backe~

he~

in the

by hard cash would

have a significant impact on the Kerensky decision to remain
in the War.
The German High Command, in April, began· to follow a
A virtual
armistic~ ensued
,.

new tactic vis-a-vis Russia.

and the Germans began a dire6t appeal. to the Russian
and people to end the war.

soldi~rs

Propaganda leaflets were circu-

lated which claimed Germany did not covet Russian land, but
only wished to live in peace.

This plan was aided by Bol-

shevik agitators who encouraged fraternizatiori between forces
as a means to an immediate peace.

These efforts were quite

successful and were followed with diplomatic initiatives
by Germany tu Russia.

Kerensky reveals later that:

"It

was the plan of the German High Command that this armistice
be followed by a separate peace ... Eer_lin's efforts to come
to a direct agreement with Russia were begun as early as

April."l~5
~erensky

tinder heavy pressure at the time from the Allies,
and the Government not only

rebu~fed

these German

'

appeals for a separate peace, but th~i began to accede to the
long standing Allied demand that they begin an offensive.
r:erensky reveals in his memoirs that "having reject0d the
idea of a separate peace, which is always a misfortune for
the country concluding it, the return to new action.became

unavoidable ... 4 6

The Provisional Governme.nt was beginning

to come to a concensus to begin an offensive and allay
Allied concerns about their reticence to fight.

The effects

of this offensive would be catastrophic, for the struggling
governmenffj.ould begin the slide to oblivion for Alexander
Kerensky.
Meanwhile, the general peace initiatives .iff the Siberian
Zimmerwaldist were gaining· momentum. ' This po.licy of "just
d efensism" 'Nhile worldng for peace vLas quite popular among
the more moderate socialists of the Revolution.

A Soviet

delegation left in June to travel around Europe and to
stimulate interest in the"'Stockholm Pe.ace Conference.

This

group at first met with limited acceptance of their appeal,
especially in France.

Eventually they convinced the Italian

Socialists to favor.the Conference.

They then received the

'greatest possible boost to their'efforts.

Sir Arthur

Henderson, a socialist member of the British cabinet, convinced
.

.

the British Labour Party to support this conference.47
The Allied governments had at first
as itinerant dreamers of no consequence.

tre~ted

these delegates

The support of the

British Labour ?arty, however, signalled that there might be
some chance for
to fruition.

~he

socialists to bring

th~is

peace conference·

The Allies immediately colluded to squash this

peace movement.

The day after the British Labour Party vote,

the British Government voted· :to- rescind the passports of all
those who wished to attend this conference.
1
.
fatal to th1s
nAscen t movemen t f or peace. +8

The effects were

1

.l

f

·The. effects of this decision also had a tremendous
impact on domestic. Russian politics.

Ambassador Buchanan told

his government that "Kerensky begged me this morning to urge
His Majesty's Government not to refuse passports to our
.Socialists. " 49

The failure of this mission under£!.-u:t 'the

position of the moderate socialists in Russia.· Having arrived
in western Europe with great hopes, they return.,e'd bitterly
.1!

disappointed.

Rex Wade, 'a western s6holar, c6ncludes that the:

moderate socialists (had) made ... ~negotiated
peace through Stockholm the·cornerstone of
their foreign policy program and (had) sent
the delegation abroad to further this cause.
Their empty-handed return contributed to
and symbolized the failure of.the-moderates
in 1917.
The admission that the Stockholm Conference would not meet
in the near future was also an admission.that t~e.pe~ce'
program of Soviet majority, ·tied as it was to

a ·ge~-ieral

peace

via the conference, was collapsing, leaving them without any
meaningful program in this ~ital area.5°

In another aiticle,

;

Wade goes so far as to conclude that the failure .of this
mission "was one of the main causes of the failure of the
moderate~ . socialists and of the victory. of the :Solsheviks. "51

The Allies cannot escape blame for this failure as they
continued their "myopic" interpretation of events without
regard for the domestic
In Russia,
evolving.

repe~cussions

rneanwhil~,

in Russia.

a new military strategy was

Kerencky later admitted that ''it was quite futile

to think of victory. . . in the
exp1atne,ct,s.:b,owejrer:, that a

new

sum~ner

of 1917.

~?
II _.I··

Kerensky'

stra'teg'y :was ~appropriate.·~·

But a victory was not necessary! Ar.President
Wilson declared categorically before Con~
gress, it was the Russian Revolution which
made it possible for America to enter the
War and thus alter fundamentally the ratio
of the contending forces in the War .•. In.
the summer of 1917 it became necessary ·
only to keep going until the arrival of the
American army on the Western Front, with all
its tremendous resources. This general
Allied task exposed itself, so far as
Russia was concerned, in a ne~ strategic
aim: we were no longer required to engag~
in a general offensive, but to compel the:
Germans to keep as many divisions as p9s's ~ble
on the Russian Front until.the autumn ..•.5 ~
Cbvi6usly, the Allies, the U~S. spedifically, played a significant role in Kerensky's decision to stay in the war.
Rex Wade, again, conclude3 that because of the policies cif
the Allies the Russians "were gradually forced into a position of simply trying to hold on while the war took its
~lj..

course."-'

Meanwhile, the Bolsheviks continued to agitate

among the lower classes.

of

The stt'ategy1 holding on perversely resulted in the
decision to initiate an offensive against the Germans.
The interpretations of the reasons for this offensive are
many.

Howeve:r, mostoCof- those·':interpretc:iti'ohs "indicate that

there :·\~as ':a' sigi-rii·ficant 'roie tpl~tyed ]hyo fhe 'Ailfefs' to tericourage this

action.

Edmund Walsh writes that Kerensky was, in part
"respondine; to the Allies Vlhen he ordered an

attack."55

An observer felt at the time that Kerensky was

convinced that "the war rr.ust be waged at
Tsereteli, the

l~ader

of the Zimmerwald movement, cited

nebulous "external factors" and supported the offensive.57
George Kennan concludes that the offensive was an effort to

1.9

"impress the Allies."5 8

Another expert speaking at the annual

meeting of the American Historical Association in 1968
said that the effort was a "final and futile sacrifice for
the .Allies." 59

This speaker also ·:pdsilts that 1--.erensky

h6ped to. eain leverage through a successful offensive which
he could use to bargain with·the Allies for ievised wa~.aims.GO

/

l.

Perhaps of crucial importance to this decision was the
visit of the Root Mission to Russia in June of 1917.

This

group, representing l~resident Hilson"~ was headed by Elihu
Root, a distinguished American but hardly an expert in Russian
affairs or for that matter particularly_interested in Russian
affairs.

In ::;hart, the goal of this mission was "to-drive

home the thought that the degree of American support for the_
Provisional Government would depend strictly on the vigor of
61
Russia's war effort." :.. Anoautb.or;twritingc a.t~i thettithe~ :,concluded
that5. the ttbb:vi~us,_:.inissi0n\'-of R0ot"' was:~to~'zba.ke~- :Russi~? fight. rr62
Walsh concluded that ''extraordinary pressure was brought to
bear on Kerensky by the Allies, who urged him to give a
practical proof of Russia's solidarity with the war aims
of the Entente.•· 6 3 In short, Root conveyed the message
to Kerensky ":\o fight, no loan ... 6L~
Kerensky later stated that his main task as Minister
of \'lar was "to restore by all means at hand the fighting
capacity of the army.

To accomplish this I was to move the

army to an offensive ... which would bring about a sharp change
in the attitude and sentiment of the arrny ... c5

Kerensky

also felt that there was a need to "wipe out the shame."66

----~----

20,

Who else would

~li·ci:td

this shame except the Allies?

Finally, Kerensky felt that only the Socialists could inspire
the war-weary army to fight.
He proved to· be utterly wrong.

Although the Russian

army ·met with success in the first 'few days of battle, it
was soon forced to retreat haphazardly.

The long

await~d

offensive, which the Allies had p~shed so hard _..i'~r, was a
,.

fiasco within days of its beginning.

In the wake of this

.

catastrophe Kerensky was appointed
premeir as ?rince
Lvov
.
.
resigned.

Kerensky tried to.emphasize that everyone. had

supported this offensive.

On this point he is almost correct.

This failed offensive had now tainted all the socialist
moderates in office with the·policy of a continued war.
the Bolsheviks had opposed the offensive.

Only

The Government

continued to alienate the lower classes and force them to
the open arms of the Bolsheviks.
In the aftermath of this fiasco, 1Cerensky appointed
L. Kornilov, over the objections of many, as suprem~ military
commander.

Kerensky viewed Kornilov as one who could help

restore order to a quickly disintegrating society.

In truth,

he had precipitated a chain of events which would lead to
his dovm:fc.ll.
Kerensky immediately scheduled a Moscow State Conference
of representatives of all facets of Russian

societ~which

he hoped would result in a new unified comrni tment among all
of Russia's disparate power groups.

The Conference failed

and only "ill'...~minated 'the disunity of the nation ... [?

21

Soon after i(erensky appointed Kornilov he began to view
him as a rival for power;

,_-:~·Indeed,

Kornilov was a dynamic

figure around whom the conservative forces of the nation (
'

could rally.

Ambassador Francis found Kornilov's appointment

"reassuring. "68 The;·Dut.chc" ambassad·o.r"'.C!;·:i~~t considered 1\or-.
nilov a. "personal friend," and he was pleased with his
appointment.69
In preparation for the Moscow Conference' J:ornilov proposed several repressive measures which.hewished. to announce
'

at the Conference.

~

Cn Aufust 23 Kornilov visited Kerensky to

try to persuade him to approve these measures.

The fact that

Kornilov brought his own guard to this cieeting only added to
the tension pervading th~ cionfrontation.
still refused to accept these measure..

Kerensky, however,
Therefore, the

Provisional Government entered the Conference with no "definite
program" and only promises for more of the same. 70
;.td.<h:avEr 2'said:.;.;

i.•(I_ ~oriJ.y

<..wi.sh

~to, :.Sav.e ~Ru'ssi;a;~

!~ornilov is report

ari'd•i.\v'i·l1-' tglad'J.y submit

.

to a strong l'rovisional Government, purified of all undesirable·
Eerens~y began to fear that Kornilov would

elements."71

"gobble up" the Government.72

In the wake of the conference

to unify the nation "rumors about possible coups d'etat were
rampant~"7J

1\round Kerensky there grew.
a . "terrifying v-acuum." 74
.
~

His days as the central figure in .the Russian drama·wer.e
coming to

~.close,

as his country polarized and he sat

paralyzed, fearing above all the outbreak of civil war.
After the
to beseech

Conferenc~more

Kornilo~

and more conservatives LeGan

to restore order.

:onspiracies were

?')

(.,c ...

plenty.

Kerensky later blames the Allies for urging Kornilov

to usurp power.75

There does seem to be evidence that the

British embassy printed and distributed posters which proclaimed Kornilov as'a national hero.76

Kerensky even charges

Lord Milner, British War Minister, with sending a letter to
Koznilov urging a coup.??

It would not be illogical, given the

:ti conclude

previous actions and positions of .the Allies,
that they were at least amenable to
ever, before Kornilov could

coup.

~rKotnilov

initiat~thi~

How-

coup a man whom

later investigators would hold ... responsible for the tragic
•course~·ofevents"

entered the picture and precipitated this

crisis.7 8
This man, V.H. Lvov, former Procurator of the Holy
Synod, saw Kerensky on September 4,
him.to speak to anyone on his behalf.

Kerensky

deni~s

authorizing

However, Lvov .left
.

.

Kerensky and traveled to military headquarteri to see Kornilov.
Lvov implied that he had been sent by Kerensl{y to present
Kornilov with three options for a future

govern~ent.

Kornilov,

believing ~erensky was abdicating his power, indi~ated l1e ·
would prefer the third option which would have made Kornilov
the sole dictator of Russia.
Lvov returned to

l~erensky

and said that

to be the supreme dictator of Russia.

J·~ornilov

v1anted

Kerensky anonymously

confirmed this by telegraph with L.ornilov.

l:ornilov thought

Kerensky was only confirming the offer made by Lvov and readily
admitted that he was prepared to take power.
rested Lvov and fired r-:ornilov.

Kerensky ar-

The Central Executive Com-

mittee of the All-Russian Soviet declared Koinilov a:traitor
and called on the army to resist his .. order.
Kornilov ·is:- saird:.tto have responded:
Russians, our great fatherland lies dying,
its hour of death is near. rorced to
act publicly, I, General Kornilov, ~declare
that the Provisional Government~ under
pressure of the Bolshevik majority of
the Soviet, acts in complete harmony
with the plans of the German General
Staff ... I swear to lead the people
:·
on the path of victory over the enemy ... Bo
With those words Kornilov ordered his protege, General
Krymov, to march on ?etrograd.
A letter written by Kerensky's personal secretary to

his wife in London as Krymov approaches Petrograd may·serve
as an indicator of Kerensky's thoughts during this crucial
time.
Kornilov the other night openly raised the
_banner of rebellion. His regiments are
marching on 2etrograd •.• A .battle is
immenent. It is impossible to foresee
the issue of the battle. If I~ornilov
wins- which is likely- our fate will be
settled, while a state of anarchy will ~
be inaugurated throughout Russia. If
our troops win thinr,s may be better,
but even then the general situation will
be worse than ever, as it is certain that
famine, riots, ect. are inevitable. As
you see I am in the mess:·and I am unable to get out. of i3 1 .. Altogether the
situation is gloomy.
This document facilitates an understanding of why Kerensky
turned to anyone who would help him oppose Kornilov.
Lenin leaped at the opportunity •
ltfayu be.· suspected;_: as~ ·biased'.:. Len1.-n'·rsaid·::

7.fOr

UB

Accor"dln.g-::to 1 KeY.ensky, who
11

Geiier§.l K·ornilbv has opened

n~

qud.te" tine:X"p'ectedvpersp~cti'l/est ~-.1 We:.: must:~. act

The Soviets · immediately

organized to defeat

at

8
bhce't fl 2

this counter-ievolution.

General Krymov's troops melted

away into the arms of Bolshevik agitators before he even
reached Petrograd.

Voicing the predominant view, one scholar

concludes that "it was due to the efforts of the Soviets,
not of the government, that the rebellion was squashed.•• 8 J
Kerensky

a~d the~mod~rates

attempt at counter-revolution:

were undermined by this
"Fear of counteP-revolution ·

had c:produced a decisive shift to the left among the working
classes." 84 In addition, Kere~sky had been forced to distribute arms and ammunition among the Bolsheviks.
thad

·been:~

It was as if he

fo:rce& -to entr.u'st::.hi's:: defense to a boa constrictor.

Cne expert best states the effect of this affair.

"The

Kornilov rebellion was essentially a test of strength between Kornilov and Kerensky; the victor ... was Lenin.u 8 5
From this point forward Kerensky's fate was sealed.· Cne
diplomat felt that the "population became convinced that the
Bolsheviks were going to have it all their ovm way. " 86 Si:x
days after Kornilov's defeat the Bolsheviks took control
of the Soviet and proposed to use the same army that had risen
against Kornilov in a new surge for power against Kerensky.
It is difficult to conclude what specific tasks the
Allies undertook to embolden J:ornilov to mnke his move for
power.

However, there is so~e evidence thit at least the

British were involved in some sort of encouragement of
Kornilov and other conservative el.ements who wished to
restore order.

At the least, one may conclude that the

Allies did not discourage this move and in fact rnay have been

..Co~cerned

conspicuously quiet on the matter.

:.onJ.ry with the

war effort, the Allies ·were seeking all means to insure a
stable pro-war. government .in Russia.

The result was the

antithesis of their desires.
November 7 quickly

approached~

· .A Russian general d.s:;reported by

Chernovt'tn-t:h'ave·~·c·cYn.clud'(~'Ci thatt.T•Kerensl;:y.~'and:·ll:is·-:grOl.ip
presentc1 up'"1td~::the

situation.-~:

demand.st,ot:.tne

The

mas·s~s

are not at
are turning to

the Left, while the intelligenttia are turnirig Right ...
Kerensky stands still and beneath him an abyss is forrning." 87

.

Very_ soon the bolsheviks made their move to obtain power.
They were met with little resistance.
on the

su~port

of the

Coss~cks;

Kerensky had depended

but the Cossacks had seen

their hero, l:ornilov, betrayed by Kerensky and they, therefore,
decided to do nothing to defend Kerensky . . Kerensky C?ntinued
to call for their help and they continued to say "yes, yes,
.
. 88
we're coming, as soon as we saddle our horses.""
They
never came and Kerensky was forced to flee.

The Bolsheviks·

had come to power and they were determined to restore order
to the society, that is a Bolshevik order of

co~munism.

Allied policy in Russia hud resulted in Abject failure.
secrE:tary writing in :::.nt;land i'n mid- ·
December of 1917 indicated that
Eerensl\:y' s fall from power

was

o~of

the main reasons for
~

the A lli;;s' "neglect of the

public opinion of the Rues ian d £or::ocracy upcn which !(ercnsky' s

administration was based.'' 89

The

~Dnchester

Guardian was

one of the few Western newspapers to indict Allied policy in

the afterm<Jth of Kerensky' s failure.

Cn :'iovcmber 10 they

edi tcrialized that' ...Allied support could have removed ..
Russia from the war pc:acefully" and avoided the rise to power
of Bolshevism.9°

Kerensky, himself, later admits that he

Jmew "the soldiers were not quite sure whether it was neces•

sary to die when there, in the rear; the fond dreams of
e;enerations were being realized."9l -Yet he continued to
accede to Allied pres sur~~ by launching the July'offcnsi ve,
Kerensky also makes the final indictment of his own and
.Allied policy by concludinG that

trump card of the
Bolsheviki was peace, peace, immediate peace!"9 2
"t~e

This paper has not sought to detail Kerensky's life, nor
has it sought to detail the policies of the }rovisional
Government; it has sought to detail the effect of the Allied
policy of insisting on a continued war effort by Russia and
to link this Allied policy with the causes for the rise of
Bolshevism.

It is not contended that this Allied policy

was the s·ole cause of Kerensky' s fall from power.

::erE:nsky

may have harbored ambitions of attaininG the dream of all
previous Russian leaders, the acquisition of Constantinople.
In acceding to the Allies' demand that he not withdraw from
the war, he probably weighed all of the possible monetary
gains he could accrue if he only "held

on:•

in the war against

the likelihood of the Bolsheviks' rising to power.

Ee

decided to place his bet on the continued war effort and he
lost.

There can be little doubt that the Allies had a sig-

nificant effect on this dcci~ion and they therefore must
be held accountable as well.
much as Kerensky lost his.

The Allies lost their bet as
Current policy-makers sh6uld

r •
~.

learn from this experience that myopic policy without
regard to the domestic repercussioni in other countries can
quite easily lead to disaster in the long term interests
of both countries.
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